



What Should Recommender Systems People Know About the Psychology of Choice and Decision Making?



1st Workshop on Decision Making and Recommendation and Acceptance Issues in Recommender Systems (DEMRA 2011)

Anthony Jameson

Research Group "Choosability Engineering"



A Classical View of Decision Making



\$24.99 Buy App




\$0.99 Buy App



\$24.99 Buy App

# Words	Usa- bility	\$\$
++	-	--
--	?	++
++	-	--

A More Comprehensive View



Relatively Comprehensive Views of Choice and Decision Making

Gigerenzer, G. (2007). *Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious*. London: Penguin.

Johnson, J. G., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2005). Rule-based decision field theory: A dynamic computational model of transitions among decision-making strategies. In T. Betsch & S. Haberstroh (Eds.), *The routines of decision making*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Collections of Articles That Represent Diverse Points of View

Koehler, D. J., & Harvey, N. (Eds.) (2004). *Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Betsch, T., & Haberstroh, S. (Eds.) (2005). *The routines of decision making*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (Eds.) (2006). *The construction of preference*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Schneider, S. L., & Shanteau, J. (Eds.) (2003). *Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Legend



- Here are some results from psychological research



- We're already taking that point into account!



- That suggests a question about recommender systems research ...



- That gives me an idea about something that I might do



- Here's what I can read to find out more about this topic

– In the notes to the slides

Mainstream Judgment and Decision Making Research

What Is a Good Choice Process? (1)



- People often want to be able to *justify* a choice to themselves – or to someone else



- Recommender systems are good at generating explanations



- But could we generate new types of explanation?



- Justifications that make the user feel good
- ... or can be used to justify the choice to someone else



Shafir, E., Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1993). Reason-based choice. *Cognition*, 49, 11–36. Reprinted in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006.

Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Bridging individual, interpersonal, and institutional approaches to judgment and decision making: The impact of accountability on cognitive bias. In S. L. Schneider & J. Shanteau (Eds.), *Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tintarev, N., & Masthoff, J. (2010). Explanation of recommendations. In F. Ricci, L. Rokach, B. Shapira, & P. B. Kantor (Eds.), *Recommender systems handbook*. Berlin: Springer.

What Is a Good Choice Process? (2)



- People don't like dealing with troubling *tradeoffs*



- RSs can compute tradeoffs well



- How can I shield the user from tradeoffs (while still helping them to make good choices)?



- Leave out options that introduce tradeoffs and are only a bit better



Yates, J. F., Veinott, E. S., & Patalano, A. L. (2003). Hard decisions, bad decisions: On decision quality and decision aiding. In S. L. Schneider & J. Shanteau (Eds.), *Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bettman, J. R., Luce, M. F., & Payne, J. W. (1998). Constructive consumer choice processes. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 25, 187–217. Reprinted in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006.

Framing Effects



- How options are formulated can influence choices, even where essentially the same information is presented



“Includes 95% of words needed by tourists”

“Omits 5% of words needed by tourists”



- Don't let *framing* differences introduce distortion



Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. *Econometrica*, 47(2), 263–295.

Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2010). *Rational choice in an uncertain world*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (Section 12.2)

Dependence on Option Set (1)



- The choice between Options *A* and *B* can be affected by the presence of an Option *C*
- *Example 1*
 - Waiter: “Fruit salad or ice cream?”
 - Diner: “Ice cream”
 - Waiter: “We also have chocolate cake”
 - Diner: “I’ll take the fruit salad”



The following articles describe not only some of the phenomena in question but also ways of modeling them computationally in a parsimonious way:

Roe, R. M., Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (2001). Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic connectionist model of decision making. *Psychological Review*, 108(2), 370–392.

Busemeyer, J. R., & Johnson, J. G. (2004). Computational models of decision making. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Dependence on Option Set (2)



- *Example 2*

- \$50: *Print-only subscription to “Economist”*
- \$100: *Electronic-only subscription*
- \$100: *Electronic and print subscription*



- How can a RS avoid distorting influences of this type?



- Eliminate ***dominated*** options
- Present options in more than one context
- ...

Multiattribute Choice Strategies (1)



- People seldom do *weighted adding*
 - Instead: ***lexicographic, elimination by aspects, satisficing*** ...
 - Typical: Use simple strategy to ***winnow***; then more effortful strategy



- One function of RSs is to winnow many options down to a few



Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). *The adaptive decision maker*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bettman, J. R., Luce, M. F., & Payne, J. W. (1998). Constructive consumer choice processes. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 25, 187–217. Reprinted in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006.

Multiattribute Choice Strategies (2)



- Help the user to do things like:
 - ... rule out all items with an undesirable property (elimination by aspects)
 - ... filter or sort options in a lexicographic way
- Formulate explanations of recommendations in terms of such a strategy
 - ... (regardless of whether the strategy was used by the system)

The Temporal Dimension



Collections of Articles About Temporal Aspects of Choice

Loewenstein, G., & Elster, J. (Eds.) (1992). *Choice over time*. New York: Sage.

Loewenstein, G., Read, D., & Baumeister, R. (Eds.) (2003). *Time and decision*. New York: Sage.

Time Discounting



- Preferring a ***smaller, sooner*** benefit to a ***larger, later*** one is often justifiable

...

- ... but people often overdo it, especially when it's "very soon"



- How can we help users avoid this bias?



- Get them to choose early - and commit themselves
- Make later consequences more salient




Read, D. (2004). Intertemporal choice. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.


Rachlin, H. (2000). *The science of self-control*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.

Temporal Choice Bracketing (1)

Narrow bracketing:



Broad bracketing:



Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (1999). Choice bracketing. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 19, 171–197. Reprinted in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006.

Temporal Choice Bracketing (2)



- **Broad bracketing** often has advantages

1. You have fewer decisions to make
2. You can take into account
 - ... considerations that apply only to **sequences** of choices
 - variety; outcomes getting better over time
 - ... predictable changes in the chooser over time
 - increase in skill; change in tastes
 - ... (for group recommenders) Overall fairness

Temporal Choice Bracketing (3)



- How can a RS support broad bracketing?



- Present each option as a *sequence* of choices
 - ... and take into account the different evaluation criteria for sequences



- This strategy is already applied in some group recommenders

How to Choose Without Deciding

Role of Emotion (1)



- The tendency to choose an option can be influenced by the emotions it evokes (*affect heuristic, somatic marker hypothesis*)
- Affective responses can be helpful, efficient signals
- How can a RS enable emotions to perform their function?
- Present options in such a way that relevant emotions can be evoked



Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason and the human brain*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), *Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press.

Role of Emotion (2)



- But affective responses can also distort and mislead



- How can such distortions be compensated for?



- Avoid stimuli that evoke irrelevant affect

Forms of Social Influence (1)



- There are various reasons why people are influenced by **social examples**
 - You can **learn** from their experience
 - You want to **identify** with their group
 - There are **practical benefits** to conformity



- Collaborative filtering systems automate learning from social examples
 - People like you choose



Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). *Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action approach*. New York: Taylor & Francis. (Chapter 4)

March, J. G. (1994). *A primer on decision making: How decisions happen*. New York: The Free Press.

Forms of Social Influence (2)



- But we could try to support identification

– “Cool machos choose “



- And we could help users achieve the practical benefits of conformity
 - “Most of the people you will want to share with use “




Forms of Social Influence (3)



- Other people sometimes have ***expectations*** that the chooser wants to take into account
 - People can ***reward or punish*** you if you don't conform
 - The expectations may be ***legitimate***



- Let's try to support these goals
 - “Your company wants you to use



”

Repetition of Previous Choices (1)



- For various reasons, people often just choose the **same option** they have chosen the past
 - They have formed a **habit**, which is triggered by a situation
 - They want to be **consistent** with their previous choices, even if these were partly arbitrary (**arbitrary coherence**)
 - They have **acquired skill or tastes** that favor the previously chosen option



Habits

Wood, W., & Neal, D. T. (2007). A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. *Psychological Review*, 114(4), 843–863.

Verplanken, B., Myrbakk, V., & Rudi, E. (2005). The measurement of habit. In T. Betsch & S. Haberstroh (Eds.), *The routines of decision making*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Johnson, J. G., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2005). Rule-based decision field theory: A dynamic computational model of transitions among decision-making strategies. In T. Betsch & S. Haberstroh (Eds.), *The routines of decision making*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Arbitrary Coherence

Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003). Coherent arbitrariness: Stable demand curves without stable preferences. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118, 73–105. Reprinted in Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006.

Ariely, D. (2008). *Predictably irrational*. New York: HarperCollins. (Chapter 2)

Repetition of Previous Choices (2)



- Content-based recommendation can efficiently propose choices similar to those from the past



- Is it realistic to interpret a user's previous choices as independent pieces of evidence about their “preferences”?



- Should a RS take into account the possible *domino effect* of its recommendation?

A Final General Question

What Are Preferences, Anyway? (1)



- The term “preferences” has several meanings, including these:
 - **Specific preferences**: “I prefer the Oxford English-French dictionary to the Collins English-French dictionary”
 - **General preferences**: “Whenever I have the choice, I choose an Oxford dictionary”
 - **Forced choice general preferences**: “I don't really care about the publisher, but if you make me choose one publisher for all my dictionaries, I'll choose Oxford”



The confusion caused by the many meanings of the term *preferences* goes largely unnoticed in the literature, even in the following collection, which offers numerous perspectives on preferences:

Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (Eds.) (2006). *The construction of preference*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

What Are Preferences, Anyway? (2)



- General preferences play a less dominant role in choice than is commonly assumed
 - ***Construction of preference***: People can arrive at a specific preference in many different ways, often with different results for different ways



- Don't assume that you can predict people's specific preferences by forcing them to specify general preferences

What Are Preferences, Anyway? (3)



- Try to avoid the term *preference* altogether, using more specific terms
 - For a specific preference: a ***choice*** made in a particular situation
 - For a general preference: A ***policy***, ***rule***, or ***attitude***